CartoonLifestyle
Northeast | ArunachalAssamTripuraManipurMeghalayaMizoramNagalandSikkim
National
Neighbour | BhutanChinaMyanmarNepalBangladesh
WorldBusinessEntertainmentSportsEnvironmentOpinionAssam Career

Bridging Hill–Valley Divide: Understanding Manipur’s Ethnic Conflict and Path to Peace

07:50 PM Dec 02, 2025 IST | Daryl Elijah
Updated At : 07:13 PM Dec 02, 2025 IST
The valleys constitute only 10 per cent of the land (with a population density of 730 persons per sq. km), while the hills cover 90 per cent (with 61 persons per sq. km).
Advertisement

In Sehken, a small village in the Churachandpur district of Manipur, the air rang with the sombre notes of songs like “Igam Hilou Ham” (“Is this not my land?”) as the bodies of 87 members of the Kuki-Zo community were laid to rest in a mass burial in December 2023—a grim reminder of a state torn apart by ethnic violence. Although the violent clashes first broke out on May 3, 2023, tensions had long fractured harmony among Manipur’s tribal communities.

To understand these tensions, it is necessary to examine the geography of the state. The valleys constitute only 10 per cent of the land (with a population density of 730 persons per sq. km), while the hills cover 90 per cent (with 61 persons per sq. km). The Kuki and Tangkhul Naga communities have historically lived in the hills, shaped in part by British policies that maintained tribal homogeneity by dividing tribes within specific regions. In contrast, the Meitei community has thrived in the fertile valleys. Over the years, however, disproportionate infrastructure development and steady socio-economic progress have favoured the valley over the hills. For instance, between 2017 and 2020, the total budget allocation for the valley was INR 21,481 crore, compared to a far lower INR 419 crore for the hills.

Struggling with financial constraints, governmental bias, and socio-economic underdevelopment, the hill population found itself at a crucial crossroads when, in March 2023, the Manipur High Court recommended the inclusion of the Meitei community in the Scheduled Tribes (ST) list—a move that would allow the Meiteis to challenge the land ownership rights of the Kukis and Nagas. Already concerned about Meitei dominance over the state’s political and economic resources, the hill population vehemently opposed the proposal, viewing it as a threat to their land rights. Additionally, the Kuki community feared that granting ST status to the Meiteis would further erode their already limited educational and employment opportunities.

This judicial recommendation became the catalyst for unprecedented conflict between the Kuki-Zo and Meitei communities. The violence has resulted in more than 260 deaths, the vandalisation of over 300 religious structures, and the displacement of more than 57,000 people—some living in relief camps, others seeking temporary shelter, and many forced to leave the state altogether.

Amid this ethnic turmoil lies a growing demand for autonomy among the hill population, with the Nagas calling for a unified homeland (“Nagalim”) and the Kukis demanding a separate administration or Union Territory status for Kuki-dominated areas. They cite what they perceive as the “brutish” dominance of the Meitei community across the state. However, any concrete move toward autonomy would require constitutional changes, particularly regarding Article 371(C)—a provision introduced in 1972 when Manipur attained full statehood. Article 371(C) empowers the President of India to provide special arrangements for the hill areas, creates the Hill Areas Committee (HAC), and mandates regular gubernatorial reports to the President on hill administration. If autonomy is to be granted, Article 371(C) would need to be expanded, or a new constitutional provision introduced to accommodate the specific demands of the Naga and Kuki communities.

The long-standing search for peace in Manipur can take shape only through multifaceted measures that go beyond conventional peacebuilding. For instance, a dual-capital governance model with a rotating capital may symbolically equalise power between the valley and the hills, but such a proposal faces major obstacles—high administrative costs, bureaucratic confusion, and potential security risks during capital transitions. Therefore, more realistic and implementable reforms are required.

One such reform is the introduction of Ethnic Impact Assessments (EIAs), which would ensure that every major law or policy is evaluated for its potential impact on the Meitei, Kuki, and Naga communities. EIAs would help identify conflict triggers, avoid the need for constitutional amendments, and minimise political instability. With civil society involvement and judicial oversight, issues such as bureaucratic delays can also be mitigated.

To address community distrust, the state could replicate fellowship models such as the PMRDF or the Gandhi Fellowship. These programs place young professionals from one community in districts dominated by another, gradually fostering trust through grassroots work in health, education, and environmental sectors. While concerns about “job-stealing” may arise, such fellowships are supplementary, time-bound, and designed to augment resources rather than replace sanctioned posts—they aim to aid, not replace.

To ease the demand for autonomy, the introduction of a Layered Territory Governance (LTG) model—similar to the Bodoland Territorial Council in Assam and various District Councils in Meghalaya—could be viable. This approach allows local autonomy without compromising Manipur’s territorial integrity, implemented through Regional Councils.

Yet, at the heart of the conflict lies the long-standing issue of land. Recent measures, such as the notification issued by the Land Resources Department outlining procedures for land-related transactions, have further deepened distrust. The Kuki Inpi Manipur (KIM), the tribe’s apex body, has criticised the notification as an attempt to encourage encroachment by non-tribal individuals. Such fears can only be addressed by implementing practical land reforms that respect Article 371(C) and customary rights.

One possible solution is to separate land into three categories of rights: surface rights (homes, villages, farmlands); resource rights (forests, minerals, bamboo), jointly managed by a state–tribal committee; and development rights (roads, hospitals, markets, tourism), which can be granted temporarily without permanent land sale. This system could be supported by digital land record cards that clearly document which rights belong to whom, reducing illegal activity and disputes. Such an approach would protect Kuki land rights, help Meitei households secure tenure in densely populated areas, and enable shared economic zones that benefit all communities.

Policymakers in Manipur do not have the luxury of a blank canvas—or what John Locke described as tabula rasa—because community tensions are rooted in decades of geographical and historical grievances. However, bridging the divide between the hills and the valley can begin only with innovative policy reforms that acknowledge the past while working toward a more inclusive, stable, and harmonious future.

Daryl Elijah is a Research Assistant, Department of International Relations, Peace and Public Policy at St. Joseph’s University, Bengaluru, He can be reach at: darylelijahh@gmail.com and Karamala Areesh Kumar is Head, Department of International Relations, Peace and Public Policy at St. Joseph’s University, Bengaluru. He can be reached at: areeshkaramalajnu@gmail.com

Advertisement