Opinion | On why Israeli ground assault on Gaza is likely to fail
As Israeli forces, with its heavy and sophisticated arsenal of weaponry, amass around the Gaza border, the Holy Land is likely to bear the brunt of another round of bloodbath, as it has for several centuries now.
Israel, under its Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, has vowed to ‘annihilate’ the Hamas network, which controls the Gaza Strip of Palestine.
Hamas, a radical Islamic terror outfit (as designated by the United States), on October 07 this year, launched a deadly attack on Israel by land, air and sea.
The Hamas attack, which according to many, completely surprised and caught the Israeli military and authorities off-guard, led to deaths of around 1400 people, including around 290 soldiers.
Israeli retaliation to the Hamas attack was swift, brutal and indiscriminate in nature as the country’s air force bombarded the Gaza Strip.
Although the Israeli authorities have claimed that its air strikes on Gaza were focused solely on Hamas strongholds, situation on the ground speaks otherwise.
Many residential localities across Gaza Strip were reduced to rubble in the intense ‘revenge’ bombing campaign by Israel, killing over 2700 people, including children, in the process.
However, the bombing campaign has, most likely, failed to make any damages to the Hamas leadership.
Hamas, might be terrorist organization, but one needs to credit it for being well organized and trained; it must have predicted and taken into consideration the Israeli retaliation.
Yes, the Israeli forces might have destroyed infrastructure belonging to Hamas, but its operatives, in most likelihood, vacated those, even before they launched the strike on Israel.
There has been no concrete evidence suggesting the Israeli airstrike having inflicted any major damage to Hamas leadership.
As the Israeli Army prepares for a ground assault on Gaza after a week-long bombing campaign, major challenges await them inside the Hamas-controlled region of Palestine.
URBAN WARFARE
The only warfare that any army in any part of the world, even the most powerful of the armies, would like to avoid is urban warfare.
No invading army likes to fight in cities; go street to street, building to building, to flush out enemy combatants, especially when the enemy is fighting in its own backyard.
Urban warfare presents challenges to invading armies like no other; just because of the fact that cities are concrete forests that offer perfect environment to maintain defensive formations with smaller troop numbers.
Among other challenges that urban warfare presents is the presence of non-combatants; in this case, the 2.3 million Palestinians, residing across the under “complete seige” Gaza Strip, who have nowhere to go and are blocked on every side of the territory.
If the Israeli forces intend not to commit any war crimes during its ground assault on Gaza, it will have to be extra cautious and keep “collateral damages” to the minimum.
While fighting the Hamas militia, the Israeli forces – if it behaves like any other professional army and abides by international war-time laws – will also have to ensure safety of 8000 Palestinian civilians for every square kilometer it advances in Gaza Strip.
Israel’s fight against the Hamas in the Gaza Strip that comprises two-thirds of urban areas, is expected to be a bloody affair, with loss of lives on both sides predicted to be massive.
Close-quarter combats, even hand-to-hand, are the main features of urban warfare.
Recent battles in urban areas like the cities of Mosul in Iraq (2017) and Mariupol in Ukraine (2022) – both having population density similar to Gaza – can be treated as examples to gauge the intensity and difficulty of fights in urban areas.
One would be the biggest fool on earth, if he believes that it would be a cake-walk for the Israeli forces inside the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip of Palestine.
The Hamas fighters have been, most probably, waiting in anticipation of a ground assault by the IDF and looks like are more than prepared for the aggressors.
SNIPERS’ PARADISE
Gaining control over major urban centres in Gaza Strip – the Gaza City, Deir al-Balah, Khan Yunis and Rafah – would be vital for the invading Israeli ground forces.
However, heavy bombardment of the Gaza Strip by the Israeli forces over the past one week has reduced areas in these major urban centres of the region, especially Gaza City, into piles of rubble.
Such areas of Gaza, which have been reduced to rubble, are likely to become the most potent allies of the defending Hamas militia.
If one needs any proof of how helpful such environments are for any defending force, history has a perfect example in store – Battle of Stalingrad.
The epic 1942 Battle of Stalingrad that epitomized urban warfare, began with intense bombing by German long-range artillery and Luftwaffe (Nazi Germany air force), reducing much of the city to rubble.
In a bid to neutralize German usage of tanks and artillery in the ruins of Stalingrad, the Soviet military leadership decided to keep the Soviet front-line formations as close as possible to those of the Germans.
This tactic, also known as ‘hugging’ the enemy, was introduced by the Soviet military leadership in a bid throw the German artillery and aircraft out of use, as use of those would have meant friendly fire casualties for the Germans.
The Red Army converted multi-floored apartments, factories, warehouses, street corner residences and office buildings into a series of well-defended strong-points with small 5–10-man units.
The close-quarter combat in ruined buildings, bunkers, cellars and sewers was soon dubbed Rattenkrieg (Rat War) by German soldiers.
Among other menace for the Germans in Stalingrad were the Soviet snipers.
Soviet snipers made full use of the ruins of Stalingrad to inflict maximum casualties on German forces; the Soviet command heavily emphasizing sniper tactics to wear down the Germans.
If history is to be treated as lesson about what not needs to be done, the Israeli forces did absolutely the opposite.
It bombed the densely populated Gaza Strip, of which two-thirds has urban centres, thus creating an environment that is more likely to suit the Hamas’ style of combat.
THE TUNNEL FACTOR
Besides urban warfare and snipers, an even more formidable challenge awaits the Israeli forces inside Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.
It’s the extensive tunnels network that the Hamas has created across the Gaza Strip over the years.
Experts have raised concerns over Israel’s ground assault, primarily due to the complex and extensive tunnels network that the Hamas created inside the Gaza Strip.
According to Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, the tunnels network in Gaza stretches to over 500 kilometres.
The Hamas, ever since it seized power in Gaza in 2007, has been expanding the tunnels network in the region.
Another battle during the Second World War – the Battle of Okinawa – serves as a perfect example of how tunnels network can deter an invading force.
In 1945, as the American forces were slowly making its way into Japanese territory, the small island of Okinawa stood in the path of the allies and mainland Japan.
So, the US decided to capture the island of Okinawa and turn it into an American base for its campaign into mainland Japan.
On April 1, 1945, — after six days of naval bombardment – US troops began their amphibious invasion of Okinawa.
But it was not until a few days into the assault that the US forces realized the kind of challenge that the island presents.
The Japanese army dug a complex and extensive tunnels system across the 70 miles long and 7 miles wide Okinawa island.
As the American troops made advances, Japanese personnel emerged out of the tunnels and mounted desperate attacks, inflicting damages on the US forces.
Concealed in a network of caves and tunnels with disguised firing positions, the Japanese troops were also able to take out tanks used to support the advancing US Marines.
Many of the Marines who fought at Okinawa later said that they never saw the enemy soldiers they fought.
The American forces suffered massive causalities in the battle of Okinawa – all thanks to the intricate tunnels network that the Japanese created in the island.
THE MULTI-FRONT WAR THREAT
Israel’s planned ground operation in Gaza might also open up several new war fronts on its borders.
Iran has already warned that it will not sit ideal and watch from the sidelines if Israel makes a ground assault on Gaza.
Iran said that it will intervene if Israel launches a ground attack on Gaza.
Iran, according to sources, is mulling to move “strategic weapons” into Syria in a bid to open another war front against Israel.
Iran had warned Israel of far-reaching consequences if a ground attack on Gaza is launched saying that it will intervene if Israel goes ahead with its plan.
On the other hand, the Hezbollah has also been threatening to launch a full-scale strike on Israel from its bases in Lebanon, if the IDF goes ahead with its planned ground strike of Gaza.
Notably, rocket strikes have already been launched from Hezbollah bases in Lebanon towards Israel.
CONCLUSION
The Israel Defence Force (IDF) is planning to launch a joint and coordinated attack on Gaza involving air, sea, and ground forces.
Israel has called up over 300,000 reserve personnel for its planned ground assault on Gaza.
Many Palestinians, who lost their near and dear ones, in the intensive Gaza bombing campaign by Israel, are also likely to take up arms alongside the Hamas against the Israeli forces.
If such a thing happens, the Israeli forces will have to beat an entire population to win an assault on Gaza, or will have to retreat empty handed.
Had not Israel carried out its bombing campaign on Gaza and simply put boots on ground, the assault would have had more chances of success.
The ground assault on Gaza will pose many challenges for the invading Israeli forces – from drones and tunnels to human shields, snipers, and more.
This proposed Israeli ground assault on Gaza is most likely to fail just because of the challenges before them; some self-created by Israel and others that the Hamas militia will present.
