Myanmar's junta leverages Myitsone dam to court Beijing

Myanmar’s military regime has renewed efforts to revive the suspended Myitsone hydropower project, seeking to leverage the controversial dam as a diplomatic and economic bargaining tool with China amid continuing international isolation.

The initiative gained renewed attention after junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing secured a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in August last year — the regime’s first significant diplomatic engagement at that level since the 2021 coup. Among the proposals discussed was the possible resumption of the long-stalled Myitsone dam in Kachin state.

Originally valued at US $3.6 billion and designed to generate 6,000 megawatts (MW) of electricity, the project was suspended in 2011 by the then President Thein Sein following widespread public opposition. Located near the confluence of the Mali Kha and N’Mai Kha rivers, the dam would flood an area comparable in size to Singapore and displace more than 10,000 people, while posing ecological risks to the Irrawaddy river system.

Regime outreach to Chinese developer

State Administration Council ministers have approached China’s State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC) to explore possible pathways for reviving the project. A review committee comprising officials from the Ministry of Electric Power and the Kachin State Natural Resources Ministry has reportedly been formed to liaise with SPIC Yunnan International Power Investment, the subsidiary that succeeded China Power Investment Corporation, the project’s original developer.

Beijing’s response has been measured. Chinese officials are understood to have conveyed that any move forward would depend on a “stable political timeframe”. The regime has proposed restarting construction of the dam after holding elections, presenting it as part of a broader post-electoral development agenda.

Energy calculus in Beijing

Analysts note that China’s current energy profile suggests limited strategic necessity for electricity imports from Myitsone. China’s installed power generation capacity exceeds 3,000 gigawatts (GW), while peak demand ranges between 1,400 and 1,600 GW, leaving substantial system-wide spare capacity. Capacity additions in hydropower, solar and wind have continued to outpace demand growth.

In this context, Myitsone does not appear central to China’s energy security. Instead, it is widely viewed as a legacy project whose suspension created diplomatic and reputational complexities in Myanmar.

Beijing has historically calibrated its engagement in Myanmar in response to domestic political sentiment. In the years immediately following the coup, China avoided high-profile political endorsement of the junta leadership, reflecting sensitivity to legitimacy concerns and public backlash within Myanmar.

Observers suggest that overtly pressing ahead with Myitsone could revive widespread opposition and undermine China’s long-term strategic interests in the country.

Ground realities in Kachin

The political and security landscape in Kachin state further complicates prospects for revival. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which exercises influence over large swathes of territory in the upper part of the state, has consistently opposed the dam, aligning itself with strong local sentiment against the project.

Although the regime retains control over some areas near the dam site, much of the surrounding upstream zone falls under KIA influence. Analysts argue that any attempt to move forward without broader political accommodation risks heightening tensions in an already militarised region.

Myitsone also forms the centrepiece of a planned seven-dam cascade system on the Mali Kha and N’Mai Kha rivers, most of whose upstream areas are now beyond the regime’s effective control.

Domestic political narrative

For the military leadership, however, Myitsone serves multiple purposes beyond power generation. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has repeatedly linked the country’s chronic electricity shortages to the project’s suspension, asserting that its 6,000 MW capacity could have alleviated national supply constraints.

During a visit to Myitkyina in December 2025, Deputy junta chief Soe Win reportedly told civil society representatives that design modifications, including a reduction in dam height and strengthened earthquake resistance, were under consideration. In recent weeks, the regime has conducted a series of public hearings in Kachin state, where officials stated that electricity from the dam would prioritise domestic consumption, with only surplus power exported.

Such statements have been interpreted as an implicit acknowledgment that China does not urgently require the dam’s output.

Principal risks

Experts identify three major risks associated with reviving the project.

First, seismic vulnerability remains a key concern. The dam site lies approximately 30 kilometres from the Sagaing Fault, one of Myanmar’s most active fault lines. While regime officials have claimed the structure would withstand earthquakes of magnitude 8 to 8.5, independent assessments have raised questions about the adequacy of proposed design safeguards, particularly given the original Concrete Face Rockfill Dam configuration. A catastrophic failure scenario could have severe consequences for Myitkyina and surrounding communities.

Second, the project carries significant political and security risks. Myitsone has long been one of Myanmar’s most contentious infrastructure projects, and its revival could reignite widespread public opposition, potentially intersecting with ongoing armed conflict in the region.

Third, financial and legal liabilities remain unresolved. Under the original contract, cancellation of the project could trigger compensation claims reportedly amounting to around US $800 million to cover sunk costs. Continued suspension, on the other hand, is said to incur annual “standby” costs of approximately US $50 million. Since the suspension in 2011, cumulative carrying costs could theoretically approach US $750 million by 2026, based on figures cited by the developer.

Revival would likely require fresh Chinese financing at a time when the regime faces severe fiscal constraints, potentially deepening long-term financial dependence.

An uncertain future

More than a decade after its suspension, the Myitsone Dam remains a symbol of contested development, sovereignty and public accountability in Myanmar. While the military regime appears keen to revive the project as part of a broader diplomatic recalibration with Beijing, significant political, security and economic obstacles persist.

Whether Myitsone moves forward will depend not only on negotiations between Naypyidaw and Beijing, but also on the evolving balance of power within Myanmar and the response of local communities whose opposition first halted the project fifteen years ago.